The Global Institute for Strategic Studies (GISS)
More than two decades after the launch of the “Global War on Terror,” Western governments are facing a new strategic question: Why does violent extremism continue to emerge despite major military and security successes against terrorist organizations?
The United States and its allies succeeded in dismantling a significant portion of Al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities, while the Global Coalition played a decisive role in defeating the so-called “caliphate” established by ISIS in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. Yet the decline of these organizations has not led to the disappearance of the phenomenon itself. Instead, it has exposed a more complex reality involving the ideological, social, and organizational pathways that often precede the emergence of armed extremist groups.
In recent years, Western security and intelligence institutions, along with leading policy and research centers, have begun reassessing the assumptions that shaped counterterrorism strategies following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Rather than focusing exclusively on designated terrorist organizations as the primary source of the threat, increasing attention has shifted toward examining what has become known as “environments conducive to extremism”—the ideological, organizational, and social ecosystems that may facilitate the spread of extremist ideas, create conditions favorable to radicalization, or provide pathways for recruitment and mobilization.
This shift reflects a growing recognition among policymakers that terrorism does not begin with the use of violence. Rather, it often develops through earlier stages involving ideological influence, identity formation, socialization, and the construction of organizational and community networks. Consequently, the focus has expanded beyond proscribed terrorist groups to encompass broader ideological spaces that are believed to foster or enable the conditions from which certain forms of violent extremism may emerge.
This evolving approach has coincided with political, security, and judicial developments across Europe and the Middle East, reigniting debate over the relationship between political Islam and jihadist movements, as well as the role of transnational ideological networks in shaping the intellectual environments from which more radical organizations have subsequently emerged.
From Targeting Terrorist Organizations to Understanding Pathways to Radicalization
For much of the past two decades, Western counterterrorism strategies have focused primarily on directly targeting armed extremist organizations through military operations, airstrikes, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement measures. These efforts produced significant results, including the killing or capture of numerous jihadist leaders and a substantial reduction in the ability of terrorist groups to control territory or conduct large-scale attacks.
However, the accumulated experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has exposed the limitations of this approach. While terrorist organizations can be militarily defeated, the ideas, networks, and social dynamics that contributed to their emergence often continue to operate in different forms, regenerating themselves through new organizational structures or through individuals acting independently of centralized command.
Recent European data indicate that the terrorist threat persists despite the decline of major jihadist organizations. According to Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2025, the European Union recorded 58 terrorist attacks in 2024—including completed, failed, and foiled attacks—while 449 individuals were arrested on terrorism-related charges across 20 EU Member States. European security agencies continue to assess jihadist terrorism as one of the principal threats to internal security in several Member States.
Against this backdrop, Western security institutions have increasingly embraced the concept of “radicalization pathways,” which views engagement in violent extremism not as a sudden event, but as the outcome of a gradual process of ideological, social, and political influence that may unfold over many years.
Within this framework, the objective is no longer limited to dismantling terrorist organizations after they emerge. Instead, increasing emphasis is placed on understanding the pre-violent stages of radicalization, including:
- Ideological mobilization networks.
- Social environments that facilitate or nurture radicalization.
- Non-violent organizations that may contribute to the dissemination of extremist ideologies.
- Digital platforms and contemporary recruitment mechanisms.
- Transnational networks that facilitate the movement of ideas, expertise, and resources across borders.
Over recent years, numerous European and American institutions have incorporated this perspective into their counterterrorism strategies, accompanied by growing discussion of “non-violent extremism” as an area warranting closer study and monitoring within broader prevention frameworks.
This evolution represents a significant shift in the philosophy of counterterrorism. Rather than asking, “How do we defeat the organization?”, an increasing number of security institutions are now asking a different strategic question:“How do we prevent the next organization from emerging?”
The Muslim Brotherhood at the Center of the West’s New Debate
As major jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have lost much of their ability to control territory and administer governance, an increasing share of Western security and academic debate has shifted toward examining organized Islamist movements that operate outside the framework of direct violence, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.
The current debate is not primarily concerned with classifying the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization or portraying it as an armed movement. Legal and political approaches to the organization continue to vary considerably from one country to another. Rather, the discussion revolves around a more complex question: To what extent can certain strands of political Islam be regarded as part of the ideological and organizational environment that has historically contributed to the emergence of more radical movements?
This question has become a central focus within European and American security institutions and policy research centers, particularly following the rise of ISIS and the broader reassessment of counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategies. Instead of viewing armed organizations as the starting point of radicalization, some newer approaches have turned their attention to the stages that precede violence, including ideological narratives, organizational networks, and recruitment and mobilization mechanisms that may contribute to an individual’s susceptibility to later involvement in more extremist projects.
From Jihadism to Political Islam
For many years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Western governments concentrated almost exclusively on Al-Qaeda, and later ISIS, as the most pressing security threats. As these organizations gradually declined, however, many security institutions began reassessing the nature of the threat itself.
With the growing body of research on radicalization pathways, a new line of inquiry has emerged. Rather than focusing on direct organizational links between political Islam and jihadist movements, it examines what some scholars describe as “ideological continuity”—the possibility that certain activist Islamist ideas may, in some contexts, provide elements later incorporated into jihadist narratives.
Within this debate, Lorenzo Vidino, an Italian-American scholar specializing in Muslim Brotherhood networks in Europe, argues that understanding political Islam has become an important component of understanding the broader ideological environment in which certain forms of contemporary extremism develop. In several of his publications, he emphasizes the need to distinguish between legitimate political participation and transnational ideological networks that seek to establish long-term influence within religious, cultural, educational, and social institutions.
According to this perspective, the importance of studying political Islam does not lie in a direct association with violence, but rather in its potential influence on shaping political and religious identities and promoting conceptions of the relationship between religion, the state, and society that differ from the liberal democratic models prevailing across much of Europe.
Why Has the European Perspective Changed?
This shift did not result from a single event but rather from the accumulation of political and security developments over many years.
In countries including France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium, security agencies have increasingly published assessments examining the activities of political Islamist networks and their potential impact on social integration and national cohesion. The emphasis has gradually expanded beyond preventing terrorist attacks to studying ideological and organizational structures believed to contribute to the development of parallel communities or transnational networks of influence.
In Germany, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz – BfV) monitors the Muslim Brotherhood as part of its mandate to observe movements considered relevant to constitutional security. According to the agency’s public reporting, this attention is not based on allegations of direct involvement in violence, but on concerns regarding long-term efforts to influence religious, educational, and social institutions. The BfV argues that the potential risk lies in the gradual reshaping of parts of the social and cultural sphere in ways that may conflict with the principles of Germany’s liberal democratic constitutional order.
In France, these discussions intensified following the series of terrorist attacks that began in 2015, culminating in the murder of teacher Samuel Paty in 2020. These events prompted the French government to broaden its counter-extremism policies by increasing scrutiny of foreign funding for religious associations and institutions and strengthening oversight of networks believed to promote separatist or isolationist ideologies.
Austria: A Case Study in the Rise of the “Political Islam” Concept
Austria has emerged as one of the European countries most explicit in adopting this approach.
In 2020, the Austrian government supported the establishment of the Documentation Centre on Political Islam, an institution dedicated to researching networks, organizations, and ideologies associated with political Islam in Austria and across Europe.
The Centre’s work is based on the premise that certain forms of violent extremism cannot be fully understood solely by studying armed organizations. Instead, it seeks to analyze the broader ideological and organizational environments that may precede them. The Centre has published several studies examining networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, describing transnational institutional structures operating in areas such as education, religious outreach, community engagement, and financing.
This approach has not been without criticism.
A number of scholars argue that the concept of “political Islam” remains too broad and lacks sufficiently precise analytical boundaries. They caution that overly expansive use of the term risks conflating actors with fundamentally different objectives, methods, and practices.
Tunisia and the Revival of the Debate
Political and judicial developments in Tunisia have brought these discussions back to the forefront in recent years.
Following years in which the Ennahda Movement rose to prominence and participated in government after the 2011 Tunisian Revolution, the country has witnessed a series of investigations and judicial proceedings involving several of the movement’s senior leaders.
In 2024 and 2025, Tunisian courts issued significant rulings against a number of prominent figures, including Rached Ghannouchi, in cases involving security- and politically-related charges that attracted considerable international attention.
Regardless of the differing political interpretations of these proceedings, developments in Tunisia have contributed to renewed discussion in Europe and the United States regarding the relationship between political Islam, national security, and institutional stability. They have also prompted several research institutions to reassess the experience of Islamist movements that entered or participated in government during the past decade and to examine their impact on political stability and state-building.
Ideological Continuity: The Core of the Debate
The concept of “ideological continuity” has become one of the most debated aspects of contemporary discussions on political Islam and violent extremism.
A number of scholars argue that the issue is not one of direct organizational command, formal membership, or hierarchical links between the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist organizations. Instead, they focus on the transmission and evolution of certain ideas, concepts, and ideological frameworks over time—from the sphere of Islamist activism to that of militant jihadism.
Proponents of this perspective point to the trajectories of several prominent jihadist figures who, at various stages of their lives, were involved in Islamist movements before later embracing violent extremism. They argue that examining these individual pathways is essential to understanding how radical ideas can evolve and develop over time.
Other scholars, however, reject this interpretation. They contend that individuals’ ideological development is far too complex to be reduced to a single linear progression and argue that historical or ideological similarities alone are insufficient to establish a direct causal relationship between political Islam and jihadist movements.
According to this view, radicalization is shaped by a broad range of interacting factors—including personal experiences, political circumstances, social environments, local conflicts, and individual agency—making it inappropriate to attribute the emergence of violent extremism to any single ideological tradition or movement.
The Grey Zone Between Political Activism and Violent Extremism
While debates surrounding political Islam have traditionally focused on ideology and doctrinal foundations, Western security discussions in recent years have expanded to encompass what has become known as the “grey zone” between political activism and violent jihadism.
The concept refers to areas in which clear distinctions between different Islamist actors become difficult to draw, whether because of ideological overlap, temporary cooperation, or converging interests under particular political or security circumstances. It does not necessarily imply a unified organization or shared command structure. Rather, it describes complex and evolving pathways through which certain individuals, networks, or narratives may move from political or religious activism into the realm of armed militancy.
The concept has gained increasing prominence among Western security institutions following the conflicts that unfolded across the Middle East and North Africa over the past decade. These conflicts revealed multiple forms of interaction between actors from different ideological backgrounds who, at times, operated within the same environments or entered into temporary alliances shaped by the realities of armed conflict.
Syria: A Complex Laboratory of Ideological Intersections
Syria has become one of the principal case studies prompting researchers and security agencies to reconsider the boundaries separating political Islam from jihadist movements.
Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the country has witnessed the emergence of dozens of Islamist actors spanning a broad ideological spectrum—from political and religious movements, to locally based armed factions, to transnational jihadist organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS.
In many instances, the boundaries between these categories proved fluid rather than fixed. Throughout the conflict, there were episodes of temporary cooperation, battlefield coordination, and tactical alliances among actors holding different ideological positions but confronting common adversaries or operating within the same theatres of war.
This complexity has challenged both researchers and policymakers seeking to understand how some individuals and networks transition from religious or political activism into armed militancy, and how local environments may gradually evolve into spaces conducive to mobilization and recruitment.
The Syrian experience has also encouraged several Western institutions to examine the concept of “incremental radicalization,” which suggests that movement toward violence often occurs gradually through successive stages of identity formation, ideological transformation, and changing political and religious worldviews, rather than through a sudden rupture.
Libya: Alliances of Necessity and a Fragmented Landscape
Libya presents a different, but equally significant, example.
Following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, dozens of armed groups and Islamist currents with diverse ideological orientations emerged across the country. In the absence of a functioning central state, shifting alliances developed among political, military, and religious actors whose roles often defied simple categorization.
The Libyan experience illustrates that the relationship between political Islam and jihadist movements cannot be understood solely as one of confrontation or separation, nor should it automatically be viewed as one of organizational unity or integration. Instead, realities on the ground frequently produced temporary cooperation or tactical coexistence, which in some cases later gave way to rivalry or armed conflict.
These evolving dynamics have become an important subject of Western research seeking to understand how environments conducive to radicalization emerge within fragile or post-conflict states.
From Organizations to Networks
One of the principal conclusions drawn by Western security institutions from the experiences of Syria, Libya, and Iraq is that contemporary security threats are no longer defined solely by hierarchical terrorist organizations.
Instead of the rigid command structures that characterized groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS during certain periods, increasing attention has shifted toward flexible networks, informal relationships, and ideological and social influence mechanisms capable of operating without a clearly identifiable central leadership.
A growing body of research suggests that individuals may move through multiple religious, political, and social environments before eventually embracing violent extremism. This has made the study of networks, social ecosystems, and radicalization environments increasingly important, complementing rather than replacing the analysis of armed organizations themselves.
Within this context, the concept of the “grey zone” has emerged as an analytical framework used by some security institutions to better understand the early stages of radicalization, rather than to establish a direct or deterministic relationship between different Islamist actors.
Why Does This Debate Matter to the West?
For policymakers in Europe and the United States, the objective is not to rewrite the history of Islamist movements, but rather to improve understanding of how future security threats develop.
Past experience has demonstrated that terrorist organizations do not emerge in a vacuum. They evolve within complex social, political, and ideological environments that shape recruitment, mobilization, and organizational development.
This recognition has led to growing interest in examining the stages that precede violence, including the narratives, networks, and organizational structures that may contribute to increasing an individual’s susceptibility to extremist mobilization.
It also explains why an increasing number of Western governments have expanded the scope of their counter-extremism research beyond armed organizations themselves, placing greater emphasis on understanding the pathways through which ideological activism may, in some circumstances, evolve into organized political violence.
How Has This Shift Shaped European and American Policies?
The changing understanding of extremism and terrorism has not remained confined to academic circles or policy research institutes. Increasingly, it has begun to influence public policy, legislation, and security practices across Europe and the United States.
In recent years, many Western governments have moved beyond an exclusive focus on designated terrorist organizations, adopting broader approaches aimed at what they consider the environments, networks, and pathways that may contribute to the emergence or spread of extremism.
This shift reflects a growing conviction among security institutions that preventing future threats requires intervention at the earliest stages of radicalization—not only after it has escalated into violence or terrorism.
France: From Counterterrorism to Combating “Separatism”
France is among the European countries where this shift has been most pronounced.
Following the wave of terrorist attacks that struck the country between 2015 and 2020, resulting in hundreds of casualties, French authorities began reassessing traditional counterterrorism tools.
The murder of French schoolteacher Samuel Paty in October 2020 became a defining moment in this reassessment. French authorities concluded that focusing solely on terrorist cells was no longer sufficient and that greater attention needed to be paid to the ideological and organizational environments believed to facilitate radicalization.
Within this context, Paris introduced policies aimed at combating what it termed “Islamist separatism,” later reflected in the 2021 Law Reinforcing Respect for the Principles of the Republic.
Among the measures introduced were:
- Tighter oversight of foreign funding for religious associations.
- Increased supervision of private schools and non-state educational institutions.
- More stringent financial and administrative transparency requirements for associations.
- Expanded government authority to monitor organizations suspected of promoting ideas considered incompatible with the principles of the French Republic.
The French government maintains that these measures are not intended to target Islam as a religion or religious practice, but rather to address networks that it believes promote social isolation, separatism, or extremist narratives.
Germany: Political Islam as a Long-Term Security Concern
Germany has pursued a broadly similar direction, albeit through a different institutional approach.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) devotes increasing attention not only to jihadist organizations but also to what it describes as “legal Islamism” or “non-violent political Islam.”
According to the BfV’s public assessments, certain organized Islamist movements may constitute a long-term challenge to Germany’s democratic constitutional order even in the absence of direct involvement in violence.
From the German perspective, the concern extends beyond terrorism itself to the gradual development of social, cultural, educational, and religious networks that could reshape concepts of citizenship, identity, and political belonging outside the framework of the country’s constitutional values.
Consequently, German security monitoring has expanded to include associations, institutions, and public figures that are not accused of engaging in terrorist activity but are considered part of the broader sphere of political Islam.
Austria: Building a New Institutional Framework
Austria represents perhaps the clearest example of translating this evolving approach into formal public policy.
In 2020, the Austrian government supported the establishment of the Documentation Centre on Political Islam, an institution dedicated to researching networks, organizations, and ideologies associated with political Islam within Austria and across Europe.
The Centre operates on the premise that counterterrorism efforts cannot focus solely on armed organizations but should also examine the broader ideological and organizational environments that may precede violent extremism.
Its creation sparked significant debate among European academics. Supporters viewed it as a proactive model for understanding radicalization, while critics argued that it risked expanding the scope of security policy to include actors with no direct involvement in violence.
The United Kingdom: The Prevent Strategy
In the United Kingdom, the Prevent Strategy has emerged as one of the most prominent examples of early intervention in radicalization pathways.
Prevent seeks to stop individuals from progressing toward extremism before they reach the stage of engaging in violence.
The programme relies on cooperation among schools, universities, local authorities, healthcare providers, and community organizations to identify early indicators of radicalization and provide appropriate interventions.
Although Prevent has attracted criticism regarding its potential impact on civil liberties and community trust, it has nevertheless become an influential model in broader Western discussions on the early prevention of extremism.
The United States: From the Global War on Terror to Early Prevention
The United States has likewise experienced a significant evolution in its counterterrorism approach.
After decades focused primarily on external threats and transnational terrorist organizations, U.S. institutions have increasingly devoted attention to understanding the ideological, social, and community-level factors that may precede radicalization.
Recent U.S. strategies emphasize that counterterrorism extends beyond military operations and intelligence activities to include strengthening community resilience, countering extremist propaganda, analyzing recruitment and mobilization pathways, and cooperating with educational institutions and civil society organizations.
This evolution reflects a growing recognition that future threats may increasingly emerge from decentralized networks and self-radicalized individuals rather than from traditional hierarchical organizations.
What Do These Policies Reveal?
Although approaches differ from one country to another, a broader trend is becoming increasingly apparent: a gradual shift from focusing exclusively on terrorist organizations toward examining and monitoring the environments, networks, and pathways that are believed to facilitate the emergence or spread of extremism.
As a result, Western policy discussions are no longer limited to asking “Who is carrying out acts of violence?” Instead, they increasingly seek to answer a more complex question:
“What conditions, ideas, and networks may pave the way for future acts of violence?”
This trend is likely to continue in the coming years as Western governments place greater emphasis on early prevention, community-based monitoring, and resilience-building alongside traditional intelligence and law-enforcement measures.
Toward a More Comprehensive Approach to Countering Extremism
Security and political developments over the past decade suggest that counterterrorism has entered a new phase, one that differs fundamentally from the approach that dominated the years following the September 11 attacks and the rise of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
While military and security operations have succeeded in weakening several major terrorist organizations and reducing their ability to control territory, repeated experience has demonstrated that dismantling armed groups does not necessarily eliminate the phenomenon of violent extremism itself. Organizations may fragment or disappear, but the ideas, networks, and social environments that contributed to their emergence can persist, adapting over time and giving rise to new forms of radicalization and violence.
Against this backdrop, governments and security institutions across Europe and the United States have increasingly broadened their focus to include the stages that precede violence. Greater attention is now devoted to ideological mobilization, transnational organizational networks, and the social and cultural environments that may contribute to vulnerability to radicalization or facilitate recruitment and mobilization.
Within this broader framework, examining the relationship between political Islam and jihadist movements has become part of a wider effort to understand pathways to radicalization, rather than simply an attempt to establish direct organizational links between different actors. Increasing emphasis is placed on analyzing the ideological and organizational dynamics that may, in certain circumstances, facilitate the transition of some individuals or networks from religious or political activism to organized violence.
At the same time, academic and political debate continues regarding both the scope of this approach and its potential implications for civil liberties. Nevertheless, a growing number of Western institutions appear to be moving toward more comprehensive preventive strategies that seek to understand and address environments conducive to radicalization before they evolve into direct security threats.
Recent European and American experience suggests that the central challenge is no longer confined to identifying and disrupting those who engage in violence. Increasingly, it lies in understanding the conditions, ideas, and networks that may create the pathways leading to future violence.
The future of counterterrorism is therefore likely to depend on governments’ ability to strike a careful balance between robust security measures and early prevention, while safeguarding both national security and the democratic principles and fundamental freedoms that underpin open societies.
Although debate continues over how best to achieve this balance, one conclusion has become increasingly evident: the post-ISIS and post-Al-Qaeda era has prompted Western governments to redefine the very nature of the threat—shifting their focus from confronting terrorist organizations themselves toward understanding and disrupting the environments that enable such organizations to emerge, evolve, and endure.